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Abstract
Conceptual combination performs a fundamental role in creating the broad
range of compound phrases utilised in everyday language. This article provides
a novel probabilistic framework for assessing whether the semantics of concep-
tual combinations are compositional, and so can be considered as a function of
the semantics of the constituent concepts, or not. While the systematicity and
productivity of language provide a strong argument in favor of assuming com-
positionality, this very assumption is still regularly questioned in both cognitive
science and philosophy. Additionally, the principle of semantic compositional-
ity is underspecified, which means that notions of both “strong” and “weak”
compositionality appear in the literature. Rather than adjudicating between
different grades of compositionality, the framework presented here contributes
formal methods for determining a clear dividing line between compositional and
non-compositional semantics. In addition, we suggest that the distinction be-
tween these is contextually sensitive. Compositionality is equated with a joint
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probability distribution modeling how the constituent concepts in the combina-
tion are interpreted. Marginal selectivity is introduced as a pivotal probabilistic
constraint for the application of the Bell/CH and CHSH systems of inequalities.
Non-compositionality is equated with a failure of marginal selectivity, or viola-
tion of either system of inequalities in the presence of marginal selectivity. This
means that the conceptual combination cannot be modeled in a joint probability
distribution, the variables of which correspond to how the constituent concepts
are being interpreted. The formal analysis methods are demonstrated by apply-
ing them to an empirical illustration of twenty-four non-lexicalised conceptual
combinations.
Keywords: conceptual combination, semantic compositionality, quantum
cognition
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1. Introduction
Humans frequently generate novel associates when presented with unfamiliar
conceptual combinations. For example, in free association experiments, subjects
frequently produce the associate “slave” when cued with the compound “pet
human” (Ramm, 2000), but neither “pet” nor “human” will have the same effect
when presented individually (Nelson et al., 2004). Such cases have been used by
some authors to argue that conceptual combinations have a non-compositional
semantics, as it is difficult to explain how the novel free associate “slave” can
be recovered from its constituent concepts.
Within cognitive science, the question of how to represent even single con-
cepts is still being debated. Different positions have been put forward, including
the prototype view, the exemplar view, and the theory theory view. Murphy
(2002) contrasts these positions, asking which is most supported by the vari-
ous aspects of cognition related to conceptual processing, e.g., learning, induc-
tion, lexical processing and conceptual understanding in children. He concludes,
somewhat disappointingly, that “there is no clear, dominant winner”. Moreover,
there is a well documented tension in cognitive science between the composition-
ality and the prototypicality of concepts, which is difficult to reconcile (Frixione
and Lieto, 2012; Fodor, 1998). Arguments in favour of compositionality centre
around the systematicity and productivity of language; there are infinitely many
expressions in natural language and yet our cognitive resources are finite. Com-
positionality ensures that this infinity of expressions can be processed because an
arbitrary expression can be understood in terms of its constituent parts. Since
compositionality is what explains systematicity and productivity, Fodor (1998)
claims that concepts are, and must be compositional, however, such claims are
at odds with well-known prototypicality effects (Frixione and Lieto, 2012; Fodor,
1998). For example, consider the conceptual combination PET FISH. A GUPPY
is not a prototypical PET, nor a prototypical FISH, and yet a GUPPY is a very
prototypical PET FISH (Hampton, 1997). Therefore, it is hard to imagine how
the prototype of PET FISH can result from some composition of the prototypes
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of PET and FISH, which makes the characterisation of concepts in prototypical
terms difficult to reconcile with compositionality (Hampton, 1997; Fodor, 1998).
This supports a view put forward by the philosopher Weiskopf (2007) when he
observed that conceptual combinations are “highly recalcitrant to compositional
semantic analysis”, but even this observation has garnered no general support.
Here, we approach the problem of non-compositionality from a novel per-
spective. We shall show that a suite of sophisticated tools have already been
developed for analysing non-compositionality, albeit in another field of science.
These tools can be naturally extended to the analysis of concepts, and provide
theoretically justified grounds for deciding whether a particular conceptual com-
bination can be considered in terms of the semantics of its constituent parts.
Specific cases will be discussed where conceptual combinations can be shown
to be non-compositional using these analytical methods. We begin with a brief
review of conceptual combination as it is currently understood in cognitive sci-
ence.
1.1. Cognitive theories, compositionality and conceptual combination
The principle of compositionality states that the meanings of higher order
expressions such as sentences are determined from a combination of the mean-
ings of their constituent parts (Costello and Keane, 2000; Mitchell and Lapata,
2010). This is a principle underlying many general theories of language, both
natural and artificial. A compositional account of conceptual combination is
closely related to the notion that concepts are atomic in nature, but this as-
sumption of atomicity is difficult to maintain when the full variety of possible
semantic behavior is considered.
Perhaps most supportive of the principle are those combinations that have
an intersective semantics, e.g., the meaning of BLACK CAT is the intersec-
tion of black objects and objects that are cats. Here, it is possible to apply
a conjunction operator between the two predicates referring to the constituent
concepts, i.e., black(x) ∧ cat(x). Such intersective semantics are compositional,
as the semantics of BLACK CAT are determined solely in terms of the seman-
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tics of the constituent concepts BLACK and CAT. It is tempting to assume that
most conceptual combinations can be modeled in this way, however, the study
of intersective combinations in cognitive science has revealed that not all con-
ceptual combinations display such intersective semantics (Hampton, 1997). For
example, the intersection of ASTRONAUT and PEN in the combination AS-
TRONAUT PEN is empty, and therefore its semantics are vacuous, despite be-
ing a concept that humans can easily comprehend (Ga¨rdenfors, 2000; Weiskopf,
2007).
A second type of conceptual combination arises when the first concept modi-
fies the head concept, e.g., in CORPORATE LAWYER, CORPORATEmodifies
the more general head concept to give a sub-category of LAWYER. Schema-
based theories of conceptual combination (Murphy, 1988; Wisniewski, 1996),
propose that the head concept is a schema-structure made up of various prop-
erty dimensions (e.g., color, size, shape etc.) and relational dimensions (e.g.,
habitat, functions, behaviors etc.). Several studies have revealed that modi-
fication can produce emergent properties, e.g., in HELICOPTER BLANKET
the modification of BLANKET by HELICOPTER generates associate proper-
ties such as “water proof”, “camouflage”, and “made of canvas”, a phenomenon
which present theories struggle to account for (Wilkenfeld and Ward, 2001), and
so is sometimes viewed as evidence for non-compositional semantics (Hampton,
1997; Medin and Shoben, 1988).
Despite these tensions underlying the assumption of compositionality, vir-
tually all researchers have at least assumed a weak form of compositionality in
their analysis of human language, where for example, the initial combination
process begins with separate meanings, but is supplemented later by external
contextual information (Wisniewski, 1996; Swinney et al., 2007). For example,
in Wisniewski (1996)’s dual process theory of conceptual combination, a compe-
tition occurs between the processes of relation linking (e.g., ZEBRA CROSSING
as a crossing for zebras), and property mapping (e.g., ZEBRA CROSSING as
a striped crossing), as the meaning of the compound is decided upon. This
process is affected by the similarity of the constituent concepts, because similar
5
concepts share many facets and so are more likely to result in a property inter-
pretation, whereas dissimilar concepts are more likely to be combined using a
relational process. Thus, ELEPHANT HORSE is more likely to result in a prop-
erty interpretation (e.g., a large horse), than ELEPHANT BOX, which is more
likely to result in a relational interpretation (e.g., a box for holding elephants),
because similar concepts share many dimensions (four legs, similar shape etc.
in the case of elephant and horse) and thus are easier to combine by mapping
one property to another. However, it is important to note that these processes
are all weakly compositional, in the sense that they rely almost exclusively
on the properties of the individual concepts. It is only later that background
knowledge is drawn upon to infer the possible emergent properties of the new
concept. Thus an ELEPHANT BOX could be deemed as likely to be made of
a strong material such as wood, and hopefully to contain air-holes. Swinney
et al. (2007) found evidence for this form of weak compositionality in concep-
tual combination, when they showed that for adjectival combinations such as
BOILED CELERY the properties of the individual words such as “green” are
activated before emergent properties such as “soft”. However, for the combina-
tion APARTMENT DOG, apartment modifies the “habitat” dimension of dog
rather than its “size” (a dog the size of an apartment), which in turn shows that
background knowledge also plays a role in early combinatory processes such as
slot selection (Murphy, 1988).
Rather than entering the debate about the proper dividing line between weak
and strong compositionality, it is our intention to provide a formal framework
to analyse the (non-)compositionality of conceptual combinations, motivated by
the analysis of composite systems in quantum physics. An important point is
that this framework can be empirically tested. Thus, we feel that it is possible
to shift this debate out of philosophy and into the realms of experimental psy-
chology,1 and this article is a step in that direction. In what follows we shall
1In much the same way as the field of physics entered the realms of experimental test-
ing with the work of Bell and Aspect, after decades of more philosophical debate as to the
separability and completeness of the quantum formalism (Isham, 1995; Laloe¨, 2001).
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discuss the combination of concepts within a tiered model of cognition. This
will provide a framework from which a (non-)compositional semantics can be
developed in further sections.
2. Probabilistic approaches to modeling conceptual combinations
It is at the symbolic level of cognition where a significant portion of the
work on compositional semantics can be placed because this is where higher
order symbolic structures and associated rules, such as grammar, are processed.
A grammar specifies the parts of a sentence, and the manner in which they fit
together. It makes sense that the semantics attributed to these primitive parts
be intuitive, for example, a noun may be mapped to a set of entities. However,
Zadrozny (1992) has suggested that it doesn’t actually matter which compo-
nents are chosen as primitive, a function can be found that will always produce
a compositional semantics. In Zadrozny’s own words, “..compositionality, as
commonly defined, is not a strong [enough] constraint on a semantic theory”.
The consequence of this with respect to the compositional semantics of natu-
ral language, and hence conceptual combination, is that meaning need not be
assigned to individual words, “we can do equally well by assigning meaning to
phonemes or even LETTERS. . . ” (Zadrozny, 1992). Opponents to Zadrozny
may argue that his position is overly pessimistic because it applies to “strong
compositionality”, a position that is clearly wrong. Nevertheless, the question
remains as to where the “meanings” might come from initially.
Consider the concept BAT. One reliable way to seek an understanding of
this concept is via free association experiments where subjects are cued with
the word “bat” and asked to produce the first word that comes to mind. Over
large numbers of subjects, probabilities can be calculated that a certain associate
is produced. Fig. 1(a) depicts such a set of data taken from the University of
South Florida word association norms (USF-norms) (Nelson et al., 2004). Upon
examination of this table, we can see that these probabilities represent two clear
senses for the cue “bat”; a SPORT sense (with relevant associates in bold) and
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Associate Probability
ball 0.25
cave 0.13
vampire 0.07
fly 0.06
night 0.06
baseball 0.05
bird 0.04
blind 0.04
animal 0.02
· · · · · ·
(a)
Associate Probability
fighter 0.14
gloves 0.14
fight 0.09
dog 0.08
shorts 0.07
punch 0.05
Tyson 0.05
· · · · · ·
(b)
Figure 1: (a) Free association probabilities for the word “boxer” (a) and the word “bat” (b).
an ANIMAL sense. Considering the full dataset2 allows us to generate the total
probability ps of recall for the sport sense by summing the probabilities of the
relevant associates: ps = 0.25 + 0.05 = 0.30. The rest of the associates all
happen to be relevant to the animal sense of bat, so pa = 0.70. The same can
be said for the concept BOXER (see Fig. 1(b) where, once again, the associates
relevant to the sport sense of BOXER are in bold).
When the preceding is considered in relation to how the conceptual combi-
nation BOXER BAT may be interpreted, then four interpretations are possible.
For example, when BOXER is interpreted as a sport and BAT as an animal,
the corresponding interpretation of the combination maybe something along the
lines of a “furry black animal with boxing gloves on”, or perhaps BOXER could
be interpreted as a sport and BAT as as a sport leading a subject to interpret
the compound as “a fighter’s implement”.
Conceptual combinations usually have more than one possible interpreta-
tion. This may arise from a range of factors, including the meaning of the
concepts themselves (e.g. BOXER can be interpreted as a dog, a sportsperson,
a pair of shorts, someone who puts things in boxes, etc.), the sentence in which
they appear, the background of the subject etc.. Different human subjects will
2Available at http://web.usf.edu/FreeAssociation/AppendixC/Matrices.A-B .
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often interpret the same conceptual combination differently, indeed, the same
human subject, if placed in a new context may very well provide a different in-
terpretation for the same concept. Thus, it is sensible to approach the analysis
of compositionality probabilistically.
In what follows each concept is assumed to have a dominant sense and one
or more subordinate senses. The distinction between the two can be inferred
from free association norms such as those discussed above. For example, the
dominance of the sport sense of BOXER is clearly evident in Fig. 1(a), where
the probability associated with the sport sense is greater than the animal sense,
which leads us to designate the sport sense as “dominant” and the “animal”
sense as subordinate. It should be noted, however, that the distinction between
“dominant” and “subordinate” senses is not necessary for the theory presented
below, rather it is an explanatory aid.
Standard probabilistic reasoning suggests that if two ambiguous concepts A
and B have behavior that can be considered as compositional, then it should
be possible to describe this behavior in terms of four dichotomous random vari-
ables, {A1,A2} and {B1,B2}, ranging over two values {+1,−1}. The numbers
1 (dominant) and 2 (subordinate) correspond to the senses attributed to the re-
spective concepts A and B. However, if a human subject is first shown the
word “vampire” and subsequently asked to interpret the compound BOXER
BAT, then they may be oriented towards giving an animal interpretation of
BAT. This suggests a minimal natural extension where A1 = +1 represents
a situation where the dominant sense of concept A was first primed and con-
cept A was indeed subsequently interpreted in that sense by the human subject.
Conversely, A1 = −1 represents the case where the dominant sense of concept
A was primed but A was not interpreted in that sense. Similarly, A2 = +1
represents a situation where a subordinate sense of concept A was first primed,
and concept A was indeed subsequently interpreted in this sense, and A2 = −1
represents the case where a subordinate sense of concept A was primed, but A
was not interpreted in this subordinate sense. Note that a concept may have
more than one subordinate sense. For example, the concept BOXER could be
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considered to have subordinate clothing sense, namely “boxer shorts”. There-
fore, the previous specification based on a primary and subordinate sense does
not preclude that the concept A is interpreted in a third sense, for example,
when A1 = −1, this can occur when concept is interpreted in the subordinate
sense modeled by A2, or a third sense. Similar relationships hold for B1 and
B2.
Priming thus allows for the experimental control of the contextual cues in-
fluencing conceptual combinations. This is important because conceptual com-
binations always appear in a context (e.g., a discourse context), which affects
how they will ultimately be interpreted. Fig. 2 gives a general representation
B2
B1
1+
1_={
1+
1_={
A2
A11+1_ }=
1+
1_
BA}=
Figure 2: A potentially compositional system S, consisting of two assumed components A
and B. S can perhaps be understood in terms of a mutually exclusive choice of experiments
performed upon those components, one represented by the random variables A1,A2 (pertain-
ing to an interaction between the experimenter and component A), and the other by B1,B2
(pertaining to an interaction between the experimenter and component B). Each of these
experiments can return a value of +1 or -1
of the reasoning used in the construction of the above probabilistic scenario. A
‘black box’ is depicted, with two proposed components, A and B, inside it. Two
different experiments can be carried out upon each of the two presumed com-
ponents, which will answer a set of ‘questions’ with binary outcomes, leading to
four experimental scenarios. For example, one experimental scenario would be
to ask whether subjects return an interpretation of the concept A that corre-
sponds to the prime A1 and similarly for B in relation to the prime B2. What
analysis can be brought to bear upon such a situation?
As with many systems, the outcomes of our experiments will have a statis-
tical distribution over all available outcomes. In what follows, we shall aim to
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develop a general mathematical apparatus that can be used to discover whether
the presumed sub-components can be considered as isolated, influencing one
another, or in some sense irreducible. We shall do this through a considera-
tion of the joint probability distribution Pr(A1,A2,B1,B2) which is used to
model the behavior of the experimental black box. While this analysis will be
performed using conceptual combinations, we emphasise that this black box is
potentially very general and that the analysis developed here can be applied to
far more than the analysis of language.
We start by noting that we can construct 16 joint probabilities, correspond-
ing to all the possible interpretations of concepts A and B that a subject might
return, across the four priming conditions:
p1 ≡ Pr(A1 = +1,B1 = +1) p2 ≡ Pr(A1 = +1,B1 = −1)
p3 ≡ Pr(A1 = −1,B1 = +1) p4 ≡ Pr(A1 = −1,B1 = −1)
p5 ≡ Pr(A1 = +1,B2 = +1) p6 ≡ Pr(A1 = +1,B2 = −1)
p7 ≡ Pr(A1 = −1,B2 = +1) p8 ≡ Pr(A1 = −1,B2 = +1)
p9 ≡ Pr(A2 = +1,B1 = +1) p10 ≡ Pr(A2 = +1,B1 = −1)
p11 ≡ Pr(A2 = −1,B1 = +1) p12 ≡ Pr(A2 = −1,B1 = −1)
p13 ≡ Pr(A2 = +1,B2 = +1) p14 ≡ Pr(A2 = +1,B2 = −1)
p15 ≡ Pr(A2 = −1,B2 = +1) p16 ≡ Pr(A2 = −1,B2 = −1). (1)
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These sixteen probabilities can be set out in an array as follows:
A
A1
+1
−1
A2
+1
−1
B
B1
+1 −1
B2
+1 −1


p1 p2
p3 p4
p5 p6
p7 p8
p9 p10
p11 p12
p13 p14
p15 p16


= PAB (2)
This matrix lists the different priming conditions in a set of four blocks, which
allows us to consider the structure of the probabilities describing the likely
interpretation of a given conceptual combination. Observe how the matrix PAB
in equation (2) is complete, in that it covers all possible priming conditions
across the respective senses of the concepts.
In what follows we will show that PAB can be used to determine whether
a conceptual combination is compositional, or not. We start by considering
what might be required in order for a conceptual combination to be deemed
compositional.
2.1. Compositional semantics
Were the semantics of the conceptual combination AB to be compositional,
how would this be reflected in its probabilistic structure? The principle of
semantic compositionality would suggest that the joint probability distribution
could be recovered from the probability distributions constructed using each
individual concept. For example, a naive assumption would be that the concepts
in the combination can be interpreted independently of one another,
Pr(Ai,Bj) = Pr(Ai) Pr(Bj), i, j ∈ {1, 2}. (3)
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The syntax of this equation clearly reflects how the probabilistic behaviour of the
conceptual combination is represented by the four joint distributions Pr(Ai,Bj).
Less naive formalisations of compositionality are possible. For example, the
competition among relations in nominals (CARIN) theory of conceptual combi-
nation proposes sixteen possible relations that can be used to link concepts, e.g.,
causes, during, for and about (Gagne and Shoben, 1997; Gagne, 2001). One pos-
sible assumption assumes that relation independently affects the interpretation
of each concept:
Pr(Ai,Bj|R) = Pr(Ai|R) Pr(Bj|R), i, j ∈ {1, 2}. (4)
whereR is a random variable over the possible implicit linking relations. CARIN,
however, assumes that when people interpret a novel conceptual combination
AB, the availability of each of these sixteen relations is determined by the rela-
tion frequency distribution for the modifying concept A. The random variable
R is thus assumed to range over these sixteen relations. Therefore, CARIN ex-
plains why MOUNTAIN GOAT is easier to interpret than MOUNTAIN MAGA-
ZINE because the located relation is more often used with the modifier MOUN-
TAIN than the about relation. The essence of the CARIN approach to inter-
preting conceptual combinations can therefore be derived as follows using using
(4) together with the assumption that the interpretation of concept B is inde-
pendent of the linking relation,
Pr(Ai,Bj) =
∑
r∈R
Pr(Ai,Bj|r) Pr(r) (5)
=
∑
r∈R
Pr(Ai|r) Pr(Bj|r) Pr(r) (6)
=
∑
r∈R
Pr(Ai, r) Pr(Bj) (7)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}. In other words, a formalisation of the CARIN model is as
follows which shows how the the relation frequency distribution for the mod-
ifying concept A is formalised by the joint distribution Pr(Ai,R). The goal
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of the preceding development of equations is not to formalise existing models,
or propose new ones, but to introduce how compositionality may defined in a
probabilistic way. Observe that the equations (3)(4),(7) all define four pairwise
joint probability distributions Pr(Ai,Bj), i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
A given conceptual combination AB is deemed compositional if and only if
a four way joint distribution Pr(A1,A2,B1,B2) exists where Pr(Ai,Bj), i, j ∈
{1, 2} are marginal distributions. This opens the door to define non-compositionality
via an unusual means, namely the inability to construct a joint probability dis-
tribution Pr(A1,A2,B1,B2) in this way.
2.2. Non-compositional semantics
To analyse non-compositionality we draw upon results from the field of quan-
tum theory in relation to entangled systems. This step is not as arbitrary as it
might at first seems. An entangled system is one for which is it impossible to
construct a four way joint distribution from four empirically collected pairwise
joint distributions. Fine’s theorem is one of the results from quantum theory
which allows entanglement to be formally defined in this way. Importantly, the
theorem states the necessary and sufficient conditions for the notion composi-
tionality introduced at the end of the previous section.
Fine (1982) provides both the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of the joint probability distribution Pr(A1,A2,B1,B2):
Fine Theorem 3 (Fine, 1982): If A1,A2,B1,B2 are bivalent random
variables with joint distributions Pr(Ai,Bj), i, j ∈ {1, 2}, then necessary and
sufficient for a joint distribution Pr(A1,A2,B1,B2) is that the following sys-
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tem of inequalities is satisfied:
−1 ≤ Pr(A1, B1) + Pr(A1, B2) + Pr(A2, B2)− Pr(A2, B1)− Pr(A1)− Pr(B2) ≤ 0
(8)
−1 ≤ Pr(A2, B1) + Pr(A2, B2) + Pr(A1, B2)− Pr(A1, B1)− Pr(A2)− Pr(B2) ≤ 0
(9)
−1 ≤ Pr(A1, B2) + Pr(A1, B1) + Pr(A2, B1)− Pr(A2, B2)− Pr(A1)− Pr(B1) ≤ 0
(10)
−1 ≤ Pr(A2, B2) + Pr(A2, B1) + Pr(A1, B1)− Pr(A1, B2)− Pr(A2)− Pr(B1) ≤ 0.
(11)
Fine referred to this system of inequalities as the Bell/CH inequalities, and
we will adhere to his labeling. Fine’s theorem permits us to analyse compo-
sitionality from the perspective of the above four equations, namely, a con-
ceptual combination AB is deemed “non-compositional” when the four pair
wise joint probability distributions depicted in table (2) do not satisfy the
Bell/CH inequalities. This implies then a joint distribution Pr(A1,A2,B1,B2)
cannot be formed such that the four pairwise joint probability distributions
Pr(Ai,Bj), i, j ∈ {1, 2} are marginal distributions. Conversely, if all inequali-
ties are satisfied the four way joint probability distrubution does exist and the
conceptal combination is thus deemed “compositional”.
In quantum physics, entangled systems adhere to a constraint variously
termed the “causal communication constraint”, “parameter independence”, “sim-
ple locality”, “signal locality”, or “physical locality”. This constraint expresses
“the probability of a particular measurement outcome on any one part of the sys-
tem should be independent of which sort of measurement was performed on the
other parts” (Cereceda, 2000). In the context of cognitive science, this constraint
has been termed “marginal selectivity” (Dzhafarov and Kujala, 2012). For ex-
ample, with respect to the conceptual combination BOXER BAT, marginal
selectivity entails the interpretation of BAT does not change when the primes
of BOXER are varied from “fighter” to “dog”. Marginal selectivity is expressed
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more formally as follows:
Pr(Ai) = Pr(Ai,B1) + Pr(Ai, B¯1) = Pr(Ai,B2) + Pr(Ai, B¯2), i ∈ {1, 2} (12)
Pr(Bj) = Pr(A1, Bj) + Pr(A¯1, Bj) = Pr(A2, Bj) + Pr(A¯2, Bj), j ∈ {1, 2}
(13)
Note how these four equations express that the interpretation of the concept
represented by the marginal probability, e.g., Pr(Ai), i ∈ {1, 2} is stable with
respect to how the other concept is primed, represented by B1 and B2.
Recently, Dzhafarov and Kujala (2012) have established a connection be-
tween cognitive modeling and Fine’s theorem using the theory of selective in-
fluences, a result that adds to the cognitive validity of Fine’s theorem. In a
model with several factors and a set of random variables describing responses,
selective influence concerns the problem of what factors influence what vari-
ables. The interpretation of conceptual combinations within a priming scenario
can be treated with a model of selective influence, with primes corresponding
to the factors affecting random variable corresponding to the interpretation of
concepts. Dzhafarov and Kujala (2012) point out that selective influence im-
plies marginal selectivity. Failure of marginal selectivity means there can be no
model of selective influence, meaning there is no joint probability distribution
Pr(A1,A2,B1,B2) where the pairwise distributions Pr(A1,B1), Pr(A1,B2),
Pr(A2,B1), Pr(A2,B2) are marginal distributions.
The proof of Fine’s theorem assumes marginal selectivity, a constraint that
holds for entangled systems of photons in quantum physics. In cognitive science,
however, concepts are not as well behaved as photons, so marginal selectivity
may or may not hold. This is a crucial point. For applications in cognitive
science, marginal selectivity must first be tested before Fine’s theorem can be
applied:
1. If marginal selectivity fails, then the conceptual combination is immedi-
ately judged as “non-compositional”.
2. If marginal selectivity holds and any of the Bell/CH inequalities are vio-
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lated, then the conceptual combination is deemed “non-compositional”.
3. If marginal selectivity holds and all of the Bell/CH inequalities ahold, then
the conceptual combination is deemed “compositional”.
In quantum physics, the so called CHSH inequality has also been used to
analyse entangled systems. The advantage of the CHSH inequality is that its
formulation based on correlations permits some insight to be gained into why
conceptual combinations are (non-)compositional. The CHSH inequality is as
follows (Cereceda, 2000):
− 2 ≤ E(A1,B1) + E(A1,B2) + E(A2,B1)− E(A2,B2) ≤ 2 (14)
The expectations can easily be computed from the matrix of probabilities (2).
For example, E(A1,B1) = p1 + p4 − (p2 + p3). Recalling from (1) that p1 =
Pr(A1 = +1,B1 = +1) and p4 = Pr(A1 = −1,B1 = −1), we recognize that p1
corresponds to a situation where concepts A and B have both been interpreted
in their dominant sense, when in both cases the dominant sense of each concept
has been primed. Similarly, p4 corresponds to both A and B being interpreted in
a subordinate sense when the dominant sense of each concept has been primed.
Thus, p1+p4 = 1 occurs when the senses of the constituent concepts are perfectly
correlated within the given priming condition. For example, assuming that the
fruit sense of APPLE was primed and food sense of CHIP was primed, perfect
correlation of senses in this priming condition means two conditions hold: (1)
when APPLE is interpreted as a fruit CHIP is always interpreted as food (p1)
and (2) when APPLE is not interpreted as fruit, CHIP is not interpreted as
food (p4). The combination of these two conditions imply that p1 + p4 = 1
and p2 + p3 = 0. Conversely, p2 + p3 = 1 occurs when the senses are perfectly
anti-correlated. For example, assume the fruit sense of APPLE is primed and
CHIP is primed in its electronic circuit sense. Perfect anti-correlation of senses
means two conditions hold: (1) when APPLE is not interpreted as a fruit, CHIP
is always interpreted as a circuit (p3) and (2) when APPLE is interpreted as
fruit, CHIP is not interpreted in its circuit sense (p2).
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With this as underlying intuition, the expectation value E(Ai,Bj) captures
how well the senses of the constituent concepts are (anti-)correlating. The
arrangement of probabilities in figure (2) is not significant. There are thus four
possible ways to arrange the quadrants, each arrangement leading to a variant
of the CHSH inequality:
− 2 ≤ E(A1,B1)− E(A1,B2) + E(A2,B1) + E(A2,B2) ≤ 2 (15)
−2 ≤ E(A1,B1) + E(A1,B2)− E(A2,B1) + E(A2,B2) ≤ 2 (16)
−2 ≤ −E(A1,B1) + E(A1,B2) + E(A2,B1) + E(A2,B2) ≤ 2 (17)
(18)
Therefore, there are four CHSH inequalities, each differing where the minus sign
is placed. The heart of each inequality is a computation involving expectations
which will be referred to as the CHSH value. When the CHSH value of any of the
inequalities lies outside of the range [-2, 2], meaning its absolute value is greater
than 2, there is no joint probability distribution Pr(A1,A2,B1,B2) such that
the four empirically collected pairwise distributions Pr(A1,B1),Pr(A1,B2),
Pr(A2,B1),Pr(A2,B2) are marginal distributions. In such a case, the associ-
ated conceptual combination is deemed “non-compositional”
Conversely, when the CHSH value lies within [-2,2] for all four inequalities,
there is a joint probability distribution Pr(A1,A2,B1,B2) where the four em-
pirically collected pairwise distributions: Pr(A1,B1),Pr(A1,B2),Pr(A2,B1),
Pr(A2,B2) are marginal distributions. In this case, the conceptual combination
is deemed “compositional”.
As was the case with Bell/CH inequalities, marginal selectivity must first be
tested before the four CHSH inequalities can be applied. The formal connection
between the CHSH inequalities and Fine’s theorem is as follows: By assuming
marginal selectivity together with the CHSH inequalities, the Bell/CH inequal-
ities can be derived.
In summary, both the Bell/CH inequalities and the CHSH inequalities allow
non-compositionality to be determined by the inability to construct a joint prob-
ability distributions across the four variables modeling how the primary and a
subordinate sense of the concepts A and B are interpreted. We now illustrate
how these probabilistic methods for analysing compositionality can be deployed
in an experimental setting.
3. Empirical Illustration
3.1. Subjects
Sixty-five subjects were recruited from the undergraduate psychology pool
at Griffith University and received credit for their participation. Only native
English speakers were selected in order remove the possibility that the interpre-
tation of conceptual combinations would be confounded by language issues.
3.2. Design and materials
We utilised four different priming regimes in order to generate the four differ-
ent experimental scenarios suggested by Fig. 2. In these experiments, subjects
were first primed and then presented with a non-lexicalised conceptual com-
bination, which they were asked to interpret also designating the senses that
were used in that interpretation. A probabilistic analysis was then performed
upon the data so obtained. Subjects were presented with twenty-four ‘true’
conceptual combinations (see below for an explanation), and so participated in
twenty-four test trials. Table 2 lists the set of conceptual combinations used, as
well as the corresponding primes.
Primes were selected from the USF free association norms (Nelson et al.,
2004) and the University of Alberta norms of homographs (Twilley et al., 1994).
The majority of primes were selected from the USF norms. The procedure for
selecting primes from these norms was to view a potential prime as a cue which
produces the concept as an associate. As an example, “money” was chosen from
the USF norms to prime the financial sense of BANK as “bank” is produced as
a free associate of the cue ‘money’. Similarly, “river” was chosen to prime the
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natural sense of BANK. Occasionally when a particular sense was not present
in the USF norms, we drew upon the University of Alberta norms. Importantly,
the USF norms were used to avoid cues such as ‘account which was associated
with both BANK and LOG, thereby minimising the possibility of priming more
than one concept at a time.
A single factor design was used, which analysed responses to non-lexicalised
conceptual combinations under priming conditions that varied between subjects.
A subject was assigned to one of four priming conditions for each presented con-
ceptual combination. For example, the four priming conditions for BANK LOG
are (1) “money” and “journal” (A1−B1), (2) “money” and “tree” (A1−B2),
(3) “river” and “journal” (A2−B1), or (4) “river” and “tree” (A2−B2). This
assignment of primes was based upon a between groups Latin square design,
such that for the 24 combinations, each participant completed each priming
condition 6 times. Combinations were chosen with the expectation that the
ambiguity of its constituents would allow a number of alternative interpreta-
tions, where each interpretation arose from a different attribution of meaning
to the underlying sense of the ambiguous concepts (Costello and Keane, 1997).
3.3. Procedure
Participants completed 3 practice trials, 24 test trials and 24 filler trials, and
Fig. 3 shows a schematic illustration of the procedure followed during a test trial.
All trials were composed of six phases, consisting of three initial time-pressured
tasks followed by three non-timed tasks. The time limitation of the first three
phases was utilised in order to maximise the effectiveness of the priming. The
experiment took around 20–30 minutes to complete, and participants pushed
the ENTER key to begin each trial.
Phases 1-2:
Two consecutive double lexical decision tasks were carried out, where partici-
pants were asked to decide as quickly as possible whether two letter strings, a
prime and the concept to be presented as a part of the compound given in Phase
3, were legitimate words, or if one of the strings was a non-word. Each lexical
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Figure 3: Example experimental structure for a trial. Non-word trials followed a similar
structure, with primes in Phase 1 and/or Phase 2 replaced with non-words. The sequence of
squares moving from left to right show the experimental flow, with each square a representation
of the screen shown to a participant. Note: the figure does not show the exact text given to
participants, and stimuli are not to scale.
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decision consisted of the the two letter strings presented in the center of screen,
one below the other, in order to discourage participants from interpreting the
two words as a phrase. Participants responded to the decision tasks by pushing
a button on the keyboard, labeled ‘word’ or a button labeled ‘non-word’ (left
arrow and right arrow keys respectively). For instance, if given the strings “coil”
and “spring”, then participants were expected to decide that both strings were
words and so push the ‘word’ key, whereas if given “grod” and “church” then
participants were expected to decide that they had been shown a non-word and
to push the ‘non-word’ key. For all of the test trials participants received two
phases of word-word strings. The response ratio for the two priming phases
were: 50% word → word (test trial), 25% non-word → non-word (filler trial),
12.5% word → non-word (filler trial), 12.5% non-word → word (filler trial). In
phases where a non-word was present, it appeared equally often in the top or
the bottom portion of the screen.
The double-lexical decision task was used to associate the priming word
and test word together without participants interpreting them as a compound
(Gagne, 2001). This procedure isolates the experimental priming to each con-
cept in the combination. For example, the lexical decision task applied to “coil”
and “spring” was designed to prime the coil sense of the concept SPRING in the
conceptual combination SPRING PLANT. The order of the two double lexical
decision tasks was counter-balanced, so that half were presented in the same
order as the compound words (e.g., “coil” and “spring” were first presented,
then “factory” and “plant”) and half were presented in the reverse order (e.g.,
first “factory” and “plant” were presented for lexical decision, followed by “coil”
and “spring”.
Phase 3:
A conceptual combination was presented in the center of the screen (e.g., “spring
plant”). Participants were asked to push the space bar as soon as they thought
of an interpretation for the compound. Filler compounds were included for the
filler (i.e., non-word) trials so as not to disrupt the participant’s rhythm in mak-
ing two lexical decisions followed by an interpretation.
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Phase 4:
Participants were asked to type in a description of their interpretation.
Phases 5-6:
Two disambiguation tasks were carried out, where participants chose what sense
they gave to each word from a list (e.g., plant = A. ‘a living thing’; B. ‘a factory’;
C. ‘other’).
3.4. Results
Experimental subcomponents utilizing non-words were discarded during the
analysis. In total, 91.5% of the interpretations provided by the subjects fell
within one of the four primed senses of the studied conceptual combinations.
As stated previously, in order to apply Fine’s theorem or the CHSH inequal-
ities for compositional analysis, marginal selectivity must first be tested. Table
1 depicts an analysis of marginal selectivity where the values in the columns
depict the difference of marginal probabilities across the conditions of the as-
sociated variable. For example, diff(A1) is the difference between the one-
marginal Pr(A1, B1)+Pr(A1, B¯1) and the other second marginal Pr(A1, B2)+
Pr(A1, B¯2). Marginal selectivity holds when these differences are zero across
all for variables. The statistical test reveals five conceptual combinations that
fail marginal selectivity. However, as there are usually sixteen data points in
each of the four pair-wise distributions (see equation (2)), the statistical test is
underpowered. As a consequence, there is uncertainty about which combina-
tions are failing marginal selectivity. For the purposes of illustration, the four
conceptual combinations BATTERY CHARGE, BILL SCALE, TABLE FILE
and TOAST GAG are assumed to satisfy marginal selectivity, as these are the
four combinations closest to satisfying marginal selectivity based on the sum of
their Chi square values (see table 1).
The result of the compositional analysis in depicted in Table 2. Despite
the findings of the analysis of marginal selectivity, we have adopted a conserva-
tive approach and flagged combinations as “non-compositional” based solely on
the assumption that they are likely to fail marginal selectivity. Of the combina-
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tions that are assumed to satisfy marginal selectivity, BILL SCALE (—CHSH—
=1.63) , TOAST GAG (—CHSH— =1.63) and TABLE FILE (—CHSH— =
0.33) are deemed “compositional” as their CHSH values are less than or equal
to 2. BATTERY CHARGE shows a slight violation of the CHSH inequalities
(—CHSH— = 2.01), but due to the lack of statistical power just mentioned,
we cannot conclude whether this combination does represent an actual case
where non-compositionality manifests in the presence of marginal selectivity
being satisitfied. Only a subsequent study with sufficient statistical power can
resolve whether such conceptual combinations exist.
Combination diff (A1) diff (A2) diff (B1) diff (B2)
boxer bat 0.175 (0.46) 0.140 (0.24) 0.338 (2.6) 0.158 (0.27)
bank log 0.055 (0) 0.092 (0.02) 0.338 (3.30*) 0.257 (1.73)
apple chip* 0.250 (2.77*) 0.114 (0.09) 0.294 (2.88*) 0.217 (0.78)
stock tick* 0.163 (0.30) 0.085 (0.02) 0.488 (5.59*) 0.386 (3.77*)
seal pack 0.083 (0.01) 0.213 (0.77) 0.162 (0.38) 0.221 (0.78)
spring plant* 0.294 (3.49*) 0.133 (0.61) 0 0.173 (0.81)
poker spade 0.136 (0.25) 0.035 (0) 0 (0) 0.113 (0.09)
slug duck 0.096 (0.03) 0.153 (0.32) 0.133 (0.21) 0.026 (0)
club bar 0.133 (0.68) 0 (0) 0.125 (0.60) 0.138 (0.37)
web bug 0.210 (0.74) 0.067 (0) 0.296 (1.70) 0.153 (0.32)
table file 0.058 (0) 0.235 (0) 0.114 (0.09) 0.113 (0.09)
match bowl 0.137 (0.18) 0.250 (1.31) 0.075 (0.01) 0.022 (0)
net cap 0.035 (0) 0.092 (0.03) 0.059 (0) 0.175 (0.46)
stag yarn* 0.375 (3.64*) 0.219 (1.14) 0.104 (0.05) 0.045 (0)
mole pen 0.125 (0.29) 0.021 (0) 0.063 (0) 0.3 (1.87)
battery charge 0.067 (0) 0.048 (0) 0.117 (0) 0.120 (0.08)
count watch 0.195 (0.89) 0.063 (0) 0.011 (0) 0.063 (0)
bill scale 0.081 (0.02) 0.113 (0.09) 0.054 (0) 0.051 (0)
rock strike 0.188 (1.47) 0.117 (0.13) 0.313 (3.79) 0.013 (0)
port vessel 0.106 (0.07) 0.085 (0.02) 0.113 (0.09) 0.118 (0.20)
crane hatch 0.141 (0.45) 0.296 (1.70) 0.149 (0.39) 0.233 (0.93)
toast gag 0.0625 (0) 0.008 (0) 0.018 (0) 0.015 (0)
star suit 0.308 (2.63) 0.163 (0.28) 0.054 (0) 0.058 (0)
fan post 0.35 (2.59) 0.125 (0.13) 0.025 (0) 0.188 (0.55)
Table 1: Analysis of marginal selectivity. Starred conceptual combinations fail marginal
selectivity (Chi square test of proportions: critical value=2.71 (α = 0.1). Bolded conceptual
combinations look to satisfy marginal selectivity
3.5. Discussion
In this discussion further details are provided in order to shed light on how
the joint probability distribution is structured when a violation occurs which
serves to illustrate a number of key features about non-compositionality. In
what follows, we shall utilize two examples: TOAST GAG and APPLE CHIP.
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Concept A Concept B Results
Combination Prime 1(A1) Prime 2 (A2) Prime 3 (B1) Prime 4 (B2) Compositional N
boxer bat dog fighter ball vampire N 64
bank log money river journal tree N 64
apple chip banana computer potato circuit N 65
stock tick shares cow mark flea N 64
seal pack walrus envelop leader suitcase N 64
spring plant summer coil leaf factory N 64
poker spade card fire ace shovel N 65
slug duck snail punch quack dodge N 63
club bar member golf pub handle N 64
web bug spider internet beetle computer N 63
table file chair chart nail folder Y [0.33] 63
match bowl flame contest disk throw N 64
net cap gain volleyball limit hat N 65
stag yarn party deer story wool N 61
mole pen dig face pig ink N 63
battery charge car assault volt prosecute ? [2.01] 63
count watch number dracula time look Y 65
bill scale phone pelican weight fish Y [1.63] 64
rock strike stone music hit union N 63
port vessel harbour wine ship bottle N 65
crane hatch lift bird door egg N 63
toast gag jam speech choke joke Y [1.23] 63
star suit moon movie vest law N 62
fan post football cool mail light N 63
Table 2: Results of the compositionality analysis: ‘Y/N’ indicates whether the conceptual
combination is compositional, or not N the number of subjects. Conceptual combinations
classified as compositional are bolded with associated CHSH values in brackets
.
TOAST GAG
Table (19) depicts the the empirical results for TOAST GAG. Here, we see
no particular ordering or patterns. In particular, when we compare the form
of the equation required for a violation (18) and the the actual values in table
(19) we can see that the probability mass does not center sufficiently around the
diagonals in such a way that it can produce the correlations between the senses
necessary to violate the CHSH inequality as |CHSH = 1.23| ≤ 2. The conceptual
combination TOAST GAG is therefore deemed to be “compositional” as a joint
probability distribution Pr(A1,A2,B1,B2) can be constructed, which models
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how it is interpreted within the given priming conditions.
T
O
A
S
T
A1(jam)
+1
−1
A2(speech)
+1
−1
GAG
B2(choke)
+1 −1
B1(joke)
+1 −1


0.50 0.4375
0.0625 0
0.625 0.375
0 0
0.29 0
0.29 0.42
0.07 0.21
0.57 0.14


(19)
APPLE CHIP
In contrast, APPLE CHIP leads to a joint distribution that has a more
interesting structure:
A
P
P
L
E
A1(banana)
+1
−1
A2(computer)
+1
−1
CHIP
B1(potato)
+1 −1
B2(circuit)
+1 −1


0.94 0.06
0 0
0 0.75
0.25 0
0 0.35
0.65 0
0.47 0
0 0.53


(20)
It is clear from the values that APPLE CHIP fails marginal selectivity.
Therefore the joint probability distribution Pr(A1,A2,B1,B2) cannot be con-
structed from the four empirically collected pairwise joint probability distribu-
tions such that these four pairwise distributions depcted in table (20) can be
recovered by marginalising this four way joint distribution. This conceptual
combination is therefore deemed “non-compositional”.
APPLE CHIP shows a strong pattern of correlation between the senses
across the four priming conditions because the probabilities are concentrated
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on the diagonals or reverse diagonals. Thus, whenever a subject interprets
APPLE as a fruit they tend to interpret CHIP in its FOOD sense. Con-
versely, if APPLE is interpreted as a ‘computer’ then a CHIP is interpreted
as an ‘electronic device’. This structure was quite common in the concep-
tual combinations that were studied. A second key factor is that a non-zero
value has been returned by the ensemble of subjects for one off-diagonal case
p2 = Pr(A1 = +1,B1 = −1) = 0.06 (see Table (2)) Even though the food sense
of CHIP has been primed, atypical interpretations of the compound are pro-
duced, for example, “apple’s growth is controlled by an internal chip”. Costello
and Keane (2000) identify three categories of non-compositionality in novel con-
ceptual combinations, and atypical instances are at the basis of one of these
categories. Some other non-compositional combinations similarly showed atypi-
cal interpretations. For example, BANK LOG also exhibits a strong correlation
between the senses: When BANK is interpreted as a financial institution, LOG
tends to be interpreted as a “record”. Conversely, when BANK is interpreted
in it’s “river” sense, LOG is interpreted as a “piece of wood”. However, there
were atypical cases where the senses cross over which produces an off-diagonal
probability e.g., “a record of a bank of a river”.
We hypothesise that one way for a conceptual combination to be deemed
non-compositional when marginal selectivity is satisfied, is for the probabil-
ity mass to be largely concentrated along diagonals together with off-diagonal
elements with small probabilities. These small probabilities reflect the atypi-
cal interpretations. (Costello and Keane, 2000). It is interesting to note that
BATTERY CHARGE, which is borderline between “compositional” and “non-
compositional”, does exhibit this structure. Based on this structure we gener-
ated a hypothetical example (N=400), with one hundred data points in each
quadrant (See equation (21)). The Chi square values for the differences in
marginal selectivity are (0.06,0,0,0) for A1,A2,B1,B2 respectively. Hence
there are minor differences in marginal probabilities, where the differences are
not significant at the 90% level. The probabilities in equation (21) yield an abso-
lute CHSH value of 2.06, therefore this hypothetical conceptual combination can
27
be classified as “non-compositional”. The atypical interpretations, highlighted
by the bolded probabilities, are what force the CHSH value to exceed the thresh-
old of two. It is this threshold that marks the border between compositionality
and non-compositionality. It is not surprising that the absolute CHSH value
is only slightly above 2, as by their very nature, atypical interpretations are
infrequent. .
A
A1(primea1)
+1
−1
A2(primea2)
+1
−1
B
B1(primeb1)
+1 −1
B2(primeb2)
+1 −1


0.85 0.05
0 0.10
0 0.92
0..08 0
0 0.06
0.86 0.08
0.07 0
0 0.93


(21)
Frequency of Interpretations
The frequency of interpretations was analysed using Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests. The results are summarised in table 4.
Consistent Inconsistent
Overall 6.88 4.72
Same Order 3.20 2.32
Reverse Order 3.67 2.40
Figure 4: Mean Number of Interpretations (Consistent or Inconsistent) with the Primes by
Prime Order (Overall, Same Prime Order, Reverse Prime Order)
As expected, overall participants gave significantly more interpretations that
were consistent with the primes (mean = 6.88), than inconsistent with the
primes (mean = 4.72), z = 4.06, p < .0001. This provides evidence that the
primes were affecting the interpretations given in the correct direction. To
analyse whether the order in which the primes were shown had an effect on
number of interpretations, we divided the consistent and inconsistent interpre-
tations into whether the priming words were in the same order or reverse order
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to that of the compound. No significant differences were found. Furthermore,
the priming effect was still present within the priming order conditions. That
is, when prime order was the same, participants gave significantly more con-
sistent interpretations (mean = 3.20) than inconsistent interpretations (mean
= 2.32), z = 2.77, p = .006. Likewise, when prime order was reversed, partic-
ipants again gave significantly more consistent interpretations (mean = 3.67)
than inconsistent interpretations (mean = 2.40), z = 3.34, p = .001. Overall,
these results provide strong evidence that the priming was effective, and that it
is independent of priming order.
Response time
The speed of producing an interpretation was analysed according to whether
it was consistent or inconsistent with regards to the priming words, and whether
this was affected by prime order. It was expected that if the priming was effective
then interpretations that were inconsistent with the primes would be produced
slower than interpretations that were consistent with the primes. As seen in
table 5, the mean response times were in the correct direction. Since a number
of participants did not give responses for all of the categories, the number of
participants in the analysis was 51. The analysis showed no main effect of
Interpretation (p = 0.297), Prime Order (p = 0.718), nor an Interpretation x
Prime Order interaction (p = 0.994). One likely reason for the non-significant
effects is the large variance in response times (range = 369ms to 10035 ms), thus
making it difficult for the mean differences to reach significance. For this reason
we feel that the frequency scores are more reliable measures, and importantly
these showed significant effects of priming.
Compound familiarity
One concern is that the evidence for non-compositionality found in this study
may be a function of familiarity. In particular, highly familiar compounds would
be expected to require less combinatorial processing as the combined meaning
may simply be retrieved from long term memory. We consider this possibility
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Consistent Inconsistent
Overall 3095.51 3288.99
Same Order 3066.47 3273.25
Reverse Order 3083.10 3299.40
(a)
Consistent Inconsistent
Overall 3138.76 3352.58
Same Order 3155.78 3329.85
Reverse Order 3098.23 3274.58
(b)
Figure 5: Mean Response Time for Producing Interpretations (Consistent or Inconsistent)
with the Primes by Prime Order (Overall, Same Prime Order, Reverse Prime Order)(a) Mean
response times (ms) before analysis (N = 65) (b) Mean response times (ms) used in ANOVA
(N = 51)
unlikely due to the experimental procedure followed. The fact that both words
are ambiguous allows the priming procedure to shift participants into consider-
ing new combined meanings. For instance, while most participants (86%) inter-
preted SPRING PLANT as “a plant that grows in spring”, when primed with
‘coil’ and ‘leaf’, 3% of participants gave the interpretation “a springy plant”.
Thus these participants have arguably been influenced by priming towards gen-
erating a new meaning, even though a highly common meaning already exists.
In fact, as previously mentioned for spring plant and other compounds the
findings of non-compositionality seem to depend upon participants producing
novel meanings for the compounds. This finding goes against the hypothesis
that non-compositionality is driven entirely by the retrieval of pre-stored mean-
ings. To test whether familiarity is associated with non-compositionality, we
obtained hit rates for each compound by typing each into google with quotes.
This measure of familiarity has been used in previous studies (e.g., (Ramm
and Halford, 2012; Wisniewski and Murphy, 2005). It was found that the nov-
elty of compounds based upon hit rates ranged from 144 (STAG YARN) to
9,460,000 (BATTERY CHARGE). To reduce the large variance obtained in the
hit rates we transformed the scores into logs of ten. If familiarity is driving the
non-compositionality results it would be expected that CHSH scores would be
positively correlated with google hit rates. To test this we calculated a Pearson
R correlation. This showed a weak positive correlation between the two vari-
ables, though this was non-significant, r = 0.21, p = .337. Thus we did not find
evidence for the hypothesis that the non-compositionality of compounds in this
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study is driven by familiarity. However, as there were only 24 compounds under
study, we acknowledge that there may not have been enough power to derive a
significant correlation.
More generally, the primes are an experimentally pragmatic means to ma-
nipulate the manner in which context affects the interpretation applied to con-
ceptual combinations, and so they need only influence the interpretation, not
determine it. The violations that do occur arise only with respect to the reported
priming conditions, and may not occur in a different experimental context.
4. Broader reflections on compositionality and non-compositionality
Costello and Keane (2000) classify non-compositional conceptual combina-
tions into three categories depending upon how their apparent non-compositionality
arises. Firstly, some combinations are deemed non-compositional because of
emergent properties, which generally arise from a meaning which is based on a
subset of atypical instances. The aforementioned PET FISH example is placed
in this category. A second set of conceptual combinations are classified non-
compositional due to the manner in which the senses of the combining words
are extended beyond their standard usage, to refer to instances outside the cat-
egories usually named by those words. Finally, some conceptual combinations
are classified as non-compositional because they make use of cognitive processes
such as metaphor, analogy or metonymy in their interpretation. Costello and
Keane (2000) use the conceptual combination SHOVEL BIRD to illustrate all
three categories:
1. A “shovel bird” could be a bird with a flat beak for digging up food
2. A “shovel bird” could be a bird that comes to eat worms when you dig in
the garden
3. A “shovel bird” could be a plane that scoops up water from lakes to dump
on fires
4. A “shovel bird” could be a company logo stamped on the handle of a
shovel
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5. A “shovel bird” could be someone allowed out of jail (free as a bird) as
long as he works on a road crew
They argue that (1) and (2) are examples of the first category because a bird
with a flat beak is atypical, whereas (3) illustrates the second category be-
cause it extends the sense of both SHOVEL and BIRD beyond their normal
usage. Finally (4) and (5) are put forward as examples of third category
due to their metaphoric nature. Costello and Keane (2000) detail how their
constraint-based theory of conceptual combination specifically relates to each
of these categories. The framework presented in this paper, however, models
the non-compositionality of SHOVEL BIRD irrespective of the category of non-
compositionality involved. For example, SHOVEL has the sense of being a tool,
or being shaped like a shovel. The concept BIRD has three senses in the preced-
ing example: relating to an animal, a plane, and a prisoner. Thus, the concept
BIRD could be modeled as consisting of both a dominant ANIMAL (A1) and
a subordinate PLANE (A2) sense, and then Bell/CH inequalities or the CHSH
inequalities applied to test for the non-compositionality of each combination
resulting from a combination of SHOVEL with BIRD.
In addition, there is no requirement in the presented analytical framework
that the concepts be homographs. We require only that there be ambigu-
ity caused by multiple possible interpretations of a concept, and this readily
presents. A WordNet analysis of the noun-noun combinations used in the com-
positional models explored by Mitchell and Lapata (2010) reveals that the vast
majority have more than one synset and hence more than one shade of mean-
ing, and these may even be related (as was the case for the polysemous con-
cept SHOVEL). Ambiguity could also derive from relations. For example, the
CARIN model assumes that relations apply to the modifier, so in ADOLES-
CENT DOCTOR (taken from (Gagne, 2001)), an ambiguity arises between the
competing relations in “doctor FOR adolescents” and “doctor IS adolescent”.
Both of these possibilities for the concept ADOLESCENT could be accessed
through priming, and then probabilistically represented with their correspond-
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ing variables A1 or A2 (Gagne (2001) provides an experimental procedure
for priming relations). DOCTOR is also ambiguous because it is polysemous,
e.g., a medical doctor, or someone holding a PhD. Both of these possibilities
could be modeled by the variables B1 and B2. This example shows that the
analytical framework presented here could be applied to the study of (non-
)compositionality in conceptual combinations which have already been consid-
ered in the literature.
As the framework is general, and can be empirically tested, we argue that
it has wide applicability for the analysis of conceptual combinations. However,
the determination of compositionality that this analysis provides must take into
account the priming conditions of the test, which empirically simulate the con-
text (e.g., the discourse context) of the interpretation; there is no result without
a supplied context (in this case the priming). This is also the case in quantum
physics; a system may be deemed compositional in one measurement context,
and not in another. It is the theory for empirically testing a dividing line be-
tween compositionality and non-compositionality that this article contributes,
not an adjudication of the ongoing debate on compositionality in conceptual
representation. One test is based on the violation of the CHSH inequalities and
the other is based on the Bell/CH inequalities. Both of these tests are examples
of the more general joint distribution criterion (JDC) proposed by (Dzhafarov
and Kujala, 2012). The JDC is decided by solving a linear programming prob-
lem of the form MQ = P,Q ≥ 0. In the context of this article, the vector
P would comprise the sixteen probabilities depicted in (2) and Q represents
the global joint distribution Pr(A1,A2,B1,B2). Dzhafarov and Kujala (2012)
prove that if marginal selectivity does not hold, then there is no solution for Q.
If marginal selectivity holds and no distribution Q can be found, then the asso-
ciated conceptual combination can be deemed non-compositional. The failure
of the linear programming solution is analogous to a violation of the Bell/CH
or CHSH inequalities.
Both the Bell/CH inequalities and the CHSH inequalities require that marginal
selectivity is satisfied. There has been some confusion about the role of marginal
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selectivity when applying these formal mechanisms to cognitive phenomena
(Dzhafarov and Kujala, 2014b). For example, Aerts et al. (2013) present an
experiment to establish whether the concepts ANIMAL and ACTS are “en-
tangled” in the expression “The Animal Acts”. Placed within the framework
presented in this paper, the goal of the experiment was to determine whether the
conceptual combination ANIMAL ACTS is compositional, or not. The authors
employed the CHSH inequality and achieve a violation, meaning the combina-
tion is “entangled”, i.e., non-compositional. However, a subsequent analysis of
the experiment showed that marginal selectivity does not hold (Dzhafarov and
Kujala, 2014b). The associated formal analysis shows that it is inapplicable
to employ the CHSH inequality, or the Bell/CH inequalities, when marginal
selectivity does not hold. Therefore, marginal selectivity should be checked
before the CHSH inequalities or the Bell/CH inequalities are applied, as has
been followed in the empirical illustration presented in this paper. This is cru-
cially different to the situation in quantum physics where marginal selectivity
seemingly always holds.
A parsimonious approach to modelling a conceptual combinations entails
that a single model can describe how it is being interpreted, namely a global
joint probability distribution can be constructed from the four empirically col-
lected pairwise joint distributions such that the empirically collected distribu-
tions can be recovered from the global distribution. Acacio De Barros (2012)
labels this fact “contextuality” because the inability to construct the joint dis-
tribution over the four variables is equivalent to the inability to assign values
to the four variables that is consistent with all the experimentally observed
marginal distributions. This notion of contextuality provides some insight into
non-compositionality as presented in this article. Intuitively, if the way the
conceptual combination is being interpreted varies sufficiently across the dif-
ferent priming conditions it will not be possible to provide a global model of
the interpretations which is consistent with how the the interpretations are be-
having with respect to the marginal distributions. We contend that in such
cases the combination is non-compositional and moreover provides an empiri-
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cally testable dividing line between compositionality and non-compositionality.
This view also holds that non-compositionality is a context-sensitive notion.
Dzhafarov and Kujala (2014a) have extended this notion of contextuality to
allow its determination within the presence of marginal selecticity not being
satisfied. This constitutes an important theoretical development as it is possi-
ble that marginal selectivity is often not satisfied for conceptual combinations,
and perhaps also for cognitive phenomena more broadly.
It appears that historically George Boole considered the problem of the con-
straints involved when trying to construct a global distribution of three variables
from pairwise joint distributions (Pitowsky, 1994), however, it is the Russian
mathematician Vorob’ev who discovered results equivalent to that of Fine’s
theorem. As he was a contemporary of Kolmogorov, who axiomatized prob-
ability theory, Vorob’ev was apparently ignored (Khrennikov, 2010). Thus, it
was quantum physics that became famous for demonstrating the impossibility
of modeling entangled systems in a single probability space. In our opinion,
this is but a quirk of the past, and Dzhafarov and Kujala (2012) have indepen-
dently shown how such results appear in cognitive psychology. The history just
sketched, together with the fact that both the CHSH inequalities and Fine’s
theorem are based solely on conventional probability theory, opens the possibil-
ity to non-controversially apply them outside of quantum physics (Aerts et al.,
2000; Khrennikov, 2010; Aerts and Sozzo, 2011).
5. Conclusions
This article departed from the assumption that conceptual combinations
may not exclusively exhibit compositional semantics. The very idea of a non-
compositional semantics has been resisted in the literature spanning cognitive
science, philosophy and linguistics, probably because the “principle of composi-
tionality” has had such a significant track record of success over a long period.
It is, however, precisely the assumption that semantics must necessarily be of
a compositional form that has been regularly questioned in a wide range of lit-
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erature. Despite this state of confusion, few analytical approaches have been
proposed that are capable of demarcating the difference between the two forms
of behavior. We have shown that it is possible to analyse the manner in which
the semantics of a given conceptual combination might be considered as compo-
sitional, or non-compositional. Indeed, it is perhaps timely to remind the reader
that we do not argue against compositional semantics per se. Rather, we have
tried in this article to shed light on the line at which it breaks down: We believe
that both compositional and non-compositional analyses will be necessary in
order to provide a full account of the semantics of language.
The semantics of concepts were modeled in terms of the different senses in
which a concept may be understood, where a given sense corresponds to the in-
terpretation attributed to a particular ambiguous concept. These senses have a
reliable intersubjective cognitive underpinning, as they were grounded in terms
of human word association norm data, which was used to predict the probabil-
ity that a subject would attribute a particular sense to an ambiguous concept.
Utilising formal frameworks developed for analysing composite systems in quan-
tum theory, we presented two methods that allow the semantics of conceptual
combinations to be classified as “compositional” or “non-compositional”. This
classification differs from previous research in two ways. Firstly, composition-
ality is not graded, e.g., “weak” vs. “strong” compositionality. Secondly, the
declaration of compositionality, or non-compositionality, is not an absolute clas-
sification, but context sensitive. An empirical study of twenty-four novel concep-
tual combinations illustrates how the classifications can be applied. Important
corollaries are:
• Conceptual combinations violating marginal selectivity cannot be mod-
eled in a single probability space across the four variables modelling the
respective interpretations of the constituent concepts. Such conceptual
combinations are immediately “non-compositional”
• When marginal selectivity does hold, and the Bell/CH inequalities or the
CHSH inequalities are not violated, then the semantics of the conceptual
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combination cannot be modeled in a four way joint probability distribu-
tion, the variables of which correspond to how the constituent concepts
are being interpreted in their respective dominant and subordinate senses.
Such conceptual combinations are “compositional”.
• When marginal selectivity does hold, and any of the Bell/CH inequalities
or the CHSH inequalities are violated, then the semantics of the con-
ceptual combination cannot be modeled in a four way joint probability
distribution. Such conceptual combinations are “non-compositional”.
This result could have a marked impact in modeling cognitive phenomena more
generally, as these phenomena are frequently assumed to be compositional, and
no thought is given as to whether the phenomenon can be modeled within a given
probability space that the modeler constructs in terms of random variables. It
is simply assumed that it can. Experiments from quantum physics show that
for entangled systems no such model exists.
Finally, this article shows quantum theory is a fruitful source of new theo-
retical insights and tools for modeling conceptual semantics as it has already
provided for other areas of cognition (Bruza et al., 2009; Aerts, 2009; Khren-
nikov, 2010; Busemeyer et al., 2011; Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012).
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